

# The Environment and Early Influences Shaping Political Thought of Niyazi Berkes in British Cyprus, 1908-1922\*

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## Abstract

Niyazi Berkes was born on 21 September 1908 in Nicosia/Lefkoşa, the capital of Cyprus. Naturally, his intellectual personality began to be shaped by the social and political context on the island as well as the empire which was in the process of imperial change. As a result of the turmoil created by the British rule, the Young Turk Revolution, the First World War, and the Turkish national struggle, the Greek and the Turkish identities for the Orthodox and the Muslim communities, respectively, were constructed. Niyazi Berkes, who was born and raised in this turbulent period, developed the Turkish national identity that laid the foundations of his patriotism among the Muslim community. But in the early years of his long life, the social and political context of Cyprus also planted the seeds of his liberal-mindedness.

**Key Words:** Niyazi Berkes, Nationalism, National Identity, British Rule, Young Turks, World War I, Turkish National Struggle.

## Özet

Niyazi Berkes 21 Eylül 1908'de İngiliz idaresine devredilmiş olan Doğu Akdeniz'deki Osmanlı adası Kıbrıs'ın Lefkoşa şehrinde dünyaya gelmiştir. Niyazi Berkes'in çocukluk ve yetişme döneminde entelektüel kişiliğini belirgin bir biçimde etkilemiş olan üç temel olgudan bahsedilebilir. Bunlardan birincisi Kıbrıs'taki özgür düşünce ortamı, ikincisi Kıbrıs'taki Müslüman ve Ortodoks cemaatlerin uluslaşma sürecine girmeleriyle beraber ortaya çıkan etnik gerilimdir. Sonuncusu ise Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914–1918) ile Anadolu'daki bağımsızlık mücadelesinin Kıbrıs'taki Müslüman-Türk ahali üzerinde yarattığı travmadır. Bu olgulardan Kıbrıs'taki liberal düşünce ortamı, Niyazi Berkes'in özgürlükçü bir aydın olmasının temellerini atmıştır. Kıbrıs'taki etnik gerilim ise Berkes'in ırkçılık-karşıtı tutumuna zemin hazırlamıştır. Yunanistan'ın büyük güçlerle, özellikle de İngiltere ile

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işbirliği içinde Anadolu'da ilerlemesi ise Niyazi Berkes'in anti-emperyalist ve vatansaver taraflarını hazırlamıştır. Sonuç olarak, bu makalede entelektüel kişiliğinin oluşumunu etkileyen olgular çerçevesinde Niyazi Berkes'in çocukluğu ve yetiştiği ortam ele alınmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Niyazi Berkes, Milliyetçilik, Kimlik Oluşum Süreçleri, İngiliz İdaresi, Jön Türkler, Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Kurtuluş Savaşı.

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Niyazi Berkes (1908-1988) was among the most prominent figures of Turkish political thought in the Republican period. He was the author of several masterpieces which broke fresh ground in the field of Turkish politics and history. Especially with his thesis “The Development of Secularism in Turkey”, Niyazi Berkes established a new approach to interpreting Turkish modernization.<sup>1</sup> Besides that, he was among the first group of intellectuals that was concerned about the failure of Kemalism in reaching the Anatolian villagers. Conducting a survey among the villagers in 1942, he wrote a monograph on some villages of Ankara, which indicated the necessity of modernizing the villages.<sup>2</sup> Later, he wrote two volumes on Turkey's economic history in which he analyzed Ottoman-Turkish social and economic structures with a ground-breaking perspective.<sup>3</sup> Most significantly, he was known as one of the most ardent ideologues of the Kemalist-left movement due to his influential articles in the journals *Yurt ve Dünya* and *Yön* and the daily *Cumhuriyet*. In short, Niyazi Berkes has a very significant place in the history of Turkish political thought thanks to his voluminous work on the social, political and economic structures of Turkey.

Niyazi [Berkes] was born on 21 September 1908 in Nicosia/Lefkoşa, the capital of Cyprus. That was the year of the Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire, an event that had tremendous impact not only within the empire but also on the surrounding neighborhood including Cyprus. He was named Niyazi, and his twin brother Enver, after the two heroes of the Revolution.<sup>4</sup> Naturally, his intellectual personality began to be shaped by the social and political context on the island as well as the empire which was in the process of imperial change. For instance, the unique history and the social structure of Cyprus prepared the ground for the cultivation of an open-minded, liberal intellectual. Moreover, his childhood and adolescence were marked by processes of national identity formation of the Orthodox and the Muslim communities on the island. This process began with the British administration (1878) and gained

momentum after the Young Turk Revolution. The process reached its zenith when the tension between the communities escalated during the First World War (1914-1918) and the Turkish national struggle (1919-1922). As a result, the Greek and the Turkish identities for the Orthodox and the Muslim communities, respectively, were constructed.<sup>5</sup> Niyazi [Berkes], who was born amid this turmoil, developed the Turkish national identity that laid the foundations of his patriotism among the Muslim community. But in the early years of his long life, the social and political context of Cyprus also planted the seeds of his liberal-mindedness.

### **Cyprus: A Cosmopolitan Society**

Cyprus has been conquered by many different people over the centuries, as the island gave them supremacy in the Mediterranean basin. As a result, the island became the crossroads for various religions and ethnicities.<sup>6</sup> In 58 BC, the Romans seized the island from Egyptians. Following the division of the Roman Empire in 395, the eastern emperors retained their sovereignty over the island. In 802 Cyprus passed into the hands of the Arabs who ruled the island for 167 years. In 969 the island was conquered by the Byzantine Empire which lost it to the Lusignan dynasty in 1184, which ruled the island for three centuries. The Venetians became the masters of Cyprus in 1489 before the island was conquered by the Ottomans in 1571.<sup>7</sup> Each of these invasions implied that the Cypriot population became more and more cosmopolitan due to the migrants coming from the ruling countries. Thus, Cyprus comprised various ethnic and religious elements long before the Ottoman conquest.

Borrowing institutions from the Islamic corpus, the Ottomans were quite capable of running the multi-religious empire. One of these institutions was “the *millet* system” based on the notion of corporate religious identity.<sup>8</sup> In this system, people were identified by religion and were granted a certain amount of autonomy with respect to “tax allocation and collection, community education, and intra-communal legal matters, especially those dealing with personal status such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance”.<sup>9</sup> That also meant that the religious communities provided not only religious but also social and political services which were perceived by the Ottomans as the private domain of the religious communities. This led to the politicization of the religious hierarchies as much as the Ottomans allowed. Moreover, the religious leaders also held some political power as providers of the popular support that constituted

the legitimacy of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman philosophy of state necessitated that the sultan should preserve justice all over the empire by observing the balance between security, wealth, the people, religion, and royal authority.<sup>10</sup> Allowing the non-Muslim subjects to preserve their religious identity within their religious hierarchy,<sup>11</sup> the *millet* system was among the major components of the “justice philosophy” that legitimized the Ottoman state. In other words, the “justice” produced by the *millet* system brought about the consent of the people and the legitimacy that the Ottomans required to administer the lands inhabited by people from various religions.

The *millet* system also elicited the peaceful coexistence of various communities in Cyprus. People were bound to their *millets* by their religious affiliations rather than ethnic origins; and religious hierarchs were heads of *millets*, reporting directly to the Sultan.<sup>12</sup> Because it was functional, even the British largely preserved the system when they took over the administration of the island from the Ottomans in 1878. Under British administration, religious institutions still maintained their monopoly and regulated the daily lives of their communities in accordance with their religious codes. But they lost their political privileges under the British model of legitimacy and politics, which introduced the idea of equality of rights and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the multi-religiosity of the *millet* system was largely conserved by the British governors.

Niyazi [Berkes] was born into this cosmopolitan, multi-religious environment. In fact, the population of Cyprus in 1906, two years before his birth, was composed of 51,309 Muslims, 180,729 Orthodox Christians, and 2,984 Maronites, Catholics, Armenians, British and Jews.<sup>13</sup> The non-Muslim community was well-established in commerce whereas the Muslim community was largely from either an agrarian or urban civil service background. Muslim peasants were small land holders who practised subsistence farming, while urban Muslims were mostly in public service.<sup>14</sup> Niyazi’s family was no exception to this generalization. His father Hüseyin Hilmi Bey worked for the State Hospital in Nicosia/Lefkoşa. One of his elder brothers was a pharmacist again working for the government. His mother, Dervişe Hanım, was a housewife who inherited property, from one of the few landowner Muslim families of Cyprus. Since almost all members of the family were

in public service, she used to sublet the shops to the non-Muslim merchants.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to the *millet* system, the Ottomans also promoted the Islamic dervish orders (*tarikât*) as an instrument for facilitating the conquest of territories largely inhabited by the non-Muslims. These orders were instrumental in the consolidation of state power through the Islamization of the non-Muslim population. Before embarking on a military campaign, the Ottomans had the strategy of sending dervishes, the Muslim mystics, who infiltrated that society in order to win the hearts and minds of the people. The dervishes appealed to the people in the new lands because of their easy and flexible interpretation of Islam as compared to Islamic orthodoxy. Even after conquests, the orders played a significant role in the Islamization of non-Muslims—especially in the Balkans.<sup>16</sup> This dervish tradition can also be found in Cyprus. For instance, Kutub Baba and Noktacı Ali Dede of the *Bektaşî* and *Halvetiye* orders, respectively, contributed greatly to the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571.<sup>17</sup> Subsequent to the conquest, *Mevlevî*, *Bektaşî*, *Nakşibendî*, and *Celvetî* orders proceeded with their mission by spreading their unorthodox understanding of Islam on the island.<sup>18</sup>

The religious unorthodoxy on the island created the liberal environment in which the young Niyazi was brought up. His father Hüseyin Hilmi Bey was a *Bektaşî*.<sup>19</sup> This was an order which was widely known for its liberal interpretation of Islam; it was more of a philosophy rather than a religion. This understanding of Islam allowed Hüseyin Hilmi Bey to become a non-practicing Muslim. On the other hand, Niyazi's mother Dervişe Hanım, was a devout Muslim though not orthodox. She was a follower of the *Mevlevî* order<sup>20</sup> which was founded by *Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi* in Anatolia as a school of philosophy with disciples from any religion.

Besides, Cyprus was also a place to which “disgraced officials” and “dangerous radicals” were exiled by the Sultans in the history of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>21</sup> Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmet Efendi (?-1732), the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris in the Tulip Era, Namık Kemal (1840-1888) and Ziya Paşa (1825-1880), the ideologues of the Young Ottoman movement, and Şair Eşref (1847-1912), the satirical poet, were some of the radical intellectuals who were banished to Cyprus. These intellectuals also contributed to the liberal political atmosphere on the island.<sup>22</sup> As a result, Niyazi became a liberal-minded intellectual open to new ideas,

cultures, and religions largely because of the multi-religious, multi-linguistic and religiously liberal society in Cyprus whose cosmopolitan nature can be traced back in history as early as ancient Egyptians.

However, the tradition of coexistence in relative peace and mutual respect began to change with British encouragement. After 1878, the Orthodox Christians and the Muslims underwent a process of national identity formation in which they evolved into Greek and Turkish Cypriots.<sup>23</sup> As a young member of the Muslim-Cypriot community, Niyazi developed a Turkish national consciousness in this turbulent era. It may seem odd that the origins of his liberal-mindedness and patriotism can both be attributed to his childhood and adolescence in Cyprus. This would make sense if one considers that it was a transitory period in which elements of change slowly replaced the elements of continuity. The manifestations of mutual tolerance and peaceful coexistence were observable together with ethnic conflict and “othering”. Subsequent to the establishment of British rule, national identities eventually became visible as mutual tolerance and peaceful coexistence were substituted by ethnic conflict and “othering”.<sup>24</sup>

### **The Early Years of British Rule in Cyprus, 1878-1908**

Both Turkish and Greek nationalist historiographies tend to emphasize the existence of national identities among the religious communities of the island long before British rule. It has been claimed that the Orthodox archbishop had welcomed the British administrators at the port as he believed that they would accelerate the unification, the *enosis*, of the island with mainland Greece. This has been one of the favorite myths of nationalist historians from both communities.<sup>25</sup> For the origins of their nationalism, both the Turkish and the Greek historians seem to be willing to go back as far as possible in history. However, recent research on the question of nationalities in Cyprus has revealed that there is no evidence for any kind of nationalism among the Orthodox or Muslim communities before 1878.<sup>26</sup>

It was only after the collapse of the traditional Ottoman system and the inception of the British political system that national identities began to emerge. In that sense, Greek and Turkish identities in Cyprus are simply political constructions. During British rule, journalists, school teachers, and civil servants—i.e. the middle class intelligentsia, imposed national identities on the Muslim and Orthodox communities. The

expansion of the capitalist print market (books and newspapers) also played a significant role in the construction of national identities by facilitating association of feelings and ideas among the religious communities.<sup>27</sup> In other words, national identities in Cyprus do not have a long term tradition;<sup>28</sup> they are the result of a constructivist process that began with British rule.

The sovereignty of Cyprus was “temporarily” transferred to the British Empire by the Cyprus Convention of 1878.<sup>29</sup> The purpose of the Sublime Porte (*Babıâli*) was to secure British support against an expansive Russia following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 that led to the loss of territory in the Caucasus. The British, on the other hand, wanted to acquire a military base to protect the Suez Canal<sup>30</sup> which provided the direct route to India and other British colonies in Asia.<sup>31</sup> From this point of view, the Convention was an example of diplomatic bargaining between two European<sup>32</sup> powers. The transfer of sovereignty was temporary and the British were to pay an annual tribute to the Ottoman Empire.

For the British, the temporary transfer of the island’s sovereignty basically meant that they now acquired the *place d’armes* necessary to secure the route to their colonies in Asia. Soon after the acquisition of the island, the British army took over bases in Egypt in 1882 for the defense of the Suez Canal, and Cyprus lost some of its value as a military base.<sup>33</sup> However, the British were unwilling to return the island to the Ottomans. In the historiography of the eastern question, the great powers perceived the Ottomans as “the sick man of Europe<sup>34</sup>”. Similarly, the British policy-makers were convinced that the Ottomans were not powerful enough to retain their sovereignty over the island. If the British returned the island back to the ailing empire, they might have lost it to a hostile, third party.<sup>35</sup>

Relying on this mentality, the British maintained their rule over the island at a reasonable price, that is, an annual tribute of £ 90.000 paid to Ottoman creditors in London who subtracted the amount from the Ottoman debt.<sup>36</sup> The tribute did not create a burden on the British economy since the British government levied taxes on their Cypriot subjects. Before British administration, the Ottomans had had a bureaucratic and complicated tax system which granted the religious communities a privileged status within the *millet* system. Particularly in Cyprus, the Orthodox Church played a significant role in collecting taxes, a right given to it just after the conquest of the island in 1571 and

extended in 1660. The Orthodox Church worked in close cooperation with the Ottomans collecting its share of the taxes from the Orthodox Cypriots.<sup>37</sup> Jan-Erik Smilden cites William Hepworth Dixon, the British author and traveler to the island in 1878, who characterized the relationship between the Ottoman Governor Besim Paşa and the Orthodox Archbishop Sophronios II as follows: “Besim held the whip, but Geronymo (Sophronios) showed him where to strike”.<sup>38</sup> This was the division of labor between the church and the Ottoman state. On the other hand, the British administration introduced a tax system after intensive research on the availability and productivity of land in Cyprus.<sup>39</sup> They came up with a system which imposed equal responsibilities on all Cypriots including the clergy who were one of the major benefactors of the previous system.

The religious institutions, especially the Orthodox archbishop, disliked the idea of equality imposed by the British administration.<sup>40</sup> They began to raise their voice against the new system which treated the religious nobility and the ordinary members of the communities equally. Furthermore, in order to collect the taxes the British administration established a *Hobbesian* state structure. Determined to ensure law and order in Cyprus, the *Hobbesian* state enforced the new rules without taking religious ranks into account. For instance, when two Orthodox priests were arrested simply because their animals entered the forest under protection, they were forced to shave just like an ordinary prisoner.<sup>41</sup> Erasing the intra-communal hierarchies, the British governors annulled the Ottoman social contract that engendered public consent through the cooptation of the *millet* leaders.

Nevertheless, the abolition of the previous social contract between the ruled and the ruler did not lead to a legitimacy crisis since the British administrators were quick to introduce their model of politics and legitimacy on the island. The British model had emerged as a result of vast experience in various British colonies and was based on dividing religious, ethnic, national, or cultural groups within a colony. Thus, scholars tend to lay the blame for the ethnic conflicts between Singhalese and Tamils, Yoruba and Igbo, Muslims and Hindus on the British colonial policy of *divide et impera*. This was a policy which allowed the British rulers to (re)direct popular discontent and transform the potential for uprisings against colonial rule into the potential for internal conflicts. In Cyprus, the Orthodox and the Muslim communities already provided

the necessary material for the implementation of the British policy of divide and rule. Shortly after the inception of the British rule, the communities began to confront each other within the new model of politics.<sup>42</sup>

First of all, the British government established the legislative council, *Kavanin Meclisi*, in 1892, which was comprised of three Muslim, nine Orthodox, and six British delegates.<sup>43</sup> The establishment of the assembly launched a competition between the interests of the three groups of delegates. Although the British Crown had the final say over its legislation, the arithmetic structure of the assembly implied that the total number of Muslim and Orthodox votes simply outnumbered the British votes.<sup>44</sup> This implied that any kind of collaboration between the Muslim and the Orthodox delegates would damage British interests on the island. However, things did not work out like that and the two communities could never cooperate against British colonialism. The leaders of the communities were convinced by the British that the Muslim and the Orthodox communities had divergent interests. Therefore, the Orthodox leadership concentrated their efforts to unify the island with Greece whereas Muslim leaders aimed at preventing the Orthodox supremacy in the assembly by acting in harmony with the British rulers.<sup>45</sup>

One of the instruments that British rulers utilized to enlarge the gap between the communities was their employment policy. The British administration recruited public servants, especially police officers, from the Muslim community.<sup>46</sup> This situation engendered hostility against the Muslims from non-Muslim communities on the island who saw the Muslims as the enforcers of British rule.

Another social source which promoted differences in the island was the newspapers published by the Orthodox and the Muslim communities. As theorized by Benedict Anderson, newspapers play a significant role in the making of new identities by providing people with the opportunity to associate themselves with each other and imagine that they are different from others.<sup>47</sup> This process occurred in Cyprus when the British allowed community newspapers to circulate on the island. *Kypros* (1878), *Cyprus Herald* (1881-1887), *Times of Cyprus* (1887), *Neon Kition* (1888), and *Evagoras* (1898) were among the newspapers published by the Orthodox community.<sup>48</sup> Conducting an extensive survey of the Orthodox newspapers, Sophocleus concludes that the written word of the newspapers replaced the spoken word and laid the foundations of Greek-

Cypriot national consciousness.<sup>49</sup> The Muslims were also encouraged to publish their communal newspapers and the following newspapers may be listed: *Saded* (1889-1889), *Zaman* (1891-1892), *Yeni Zaman* (1892-1893), *Kıbrıs* (1893-1898), *Kokonoz* (1896-1897), *Akbaba* (1897-1898), *Feryat* (1899-1900), *Mirat-ı Zaman* (1900-1910), *Sünihat* (1906-1912), *İslam* (1907-1909), *Vatan* (1911-1913), *Seyf* (1912-14) and *Kıbrıs* (1913-1914).<sup>50</sup> These had a similar impact on the Muslim community and led to the emergence of another homogeneous group on the island. As a result, the Muslims and the Orthodox acquired separate national identities with separate languages and religions.

Educational institutions also played a significant role in the process of the formation of national identity after 1878. In general, the British colonial education policy was based on their experience in India. They wanted to raise a generation of locals within British culture who would then serve as mediators between the British administration and colonial society.<sup>51</sup> But in Cyprus, the British did not follow this traditional educational policy designed to produce “Cypriot gentlemen” who would serve their colonial administration.<sup>52</sup> They rather augmented the number of traditional schools based on religious segregation. In fact, between the years 1881 and 1901, the number of Muslim schools increased from 71 to 144 and the number of Muslim students increased from 1869 to 5176. Similarly, the number of Orthodox schools increased from 99 to 273 and the number of Orthodox students increased from 4907 to 15.712 in the same period.<sup>53</sup> What is more striking is the fact that these institutions promoted nationalistic ideas among the Orthodox and the Muslim students. In this period, courses on Greek and Ottoman nationalisms became natural elements of school curricula. For instance, some of the courses were titled “Heroes of New Greece” (*i iroes tis neas ellados*) and “On [Hellenic] National Education” (*peri ethnikiş agosis*) in the Orthodox schools.<sup>54</sup> In his memoirs, Canon F. D. Newham, the Chief Inspector of British schools, noted that when he asked to hear the Orthodox school-children sing, they usually responded with a war song: “Forward, follow the drum that leads us against the Turks.”<sup>55</sup> The focus of education in the Muslim schools was also eventually shifted from religious, traditional, and cultural components towards linguistic and nationalistic items. The British designed an educational policy for Cyprus which would sharply divide the island into two and abandoned the traditional British colonial

educational policy aimed at producing a local elite serving for the colonial administration.

As a result, the British strategy of dividing Cyprus along religious and linguistic lines paid off well and ethnic tensions between the Muslim and the Orthodox communities began to escalate during the early years of British rule. There were reports of various instances of ethnic hostilities between the two communities. The daily *Kıbrıs* (19 March 1894) reported that during the carnival in Baf/Baphos, a group of Orthodox Christians humiliated Muslims and became involved in a fight with the Muslims.<sup>56</sup> On Greek Independence Day in 1895, there had been several events where the Muslims were insulted by their Orthodox compatriots. School children, for example, paraded through the predominantly Muslim Tahtakale quarter of Nicosia/Lefkoşa singing about slaughtering hated Muslims.<sup>57</sup> Again in 1895, the British Commissioner, B. Travers, reported that the Orthodox deliberately provoked the Muslims at Vitsadha and Vatili.<sup>58</sup> In the legislative Council, the Orthodox delegates used every opportunity to pass a resolution to cede Cyprus to Greece. They tried to do so when one of the Muslim delegates, Derviş Paşa, was absent from the council in 1903.<sup>59</sup> In reaction, Muslim members of the council moved an amendment that if Cyprus were ceded to anyone it should be the Ottomans in accordance with the Cyprus Convention of 1878.<sup>60</sup> Tensions subsided with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 but resumed when the Ottoman Empire lost Crete to Greece in 1909. The retreat of the Ottoman Empire after the Tripoli (1911) and Balkan Wars (1912-13) also destroyed the possibility of conciliation between the two communities of the island.

### **Young Turks in Cyprus: The Revolution and After, 1908-1914**

One of the unintended consequences of the modern educational institutions established by Abdulhamid II was the emergence of an enlightened intelligentsia within the ranks of the civil and military bureaucracy which adhered to the principles of the French Revolution. This group of intellectuals, who are widely known as the Young Turks,<sup>61</sup> advocated that the only political model which could prevent the decay of the empire was constitutional monarchy in which all religious and linguistic elements of the empire were represented.<sup>62</sup>

Despite their strong attachment to the idea of constitutional monarchy, the Young Turks were ideologically divided into several factions.<sup>63</sup> One

of the leading factions was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), whose aim was to bring about “union and progress.” It was led by Ahmet Rıza, a Young Turk ideologue inspired by the ideas of the French sociologist, August Comte. Ahmet Rıza and his supporters believed that progress could be achieved within a society using positivist ideas.<sup>64</sup> In the Ottoman case, the positivist order entailed the union of all Ottomans without respect to religion, language, and ethnicity. This was the dominant element of the Young Turk ideology in 1908 when the Committee succeeded in restoring the constitution, which had been shelved by Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) in 1878. The 1908 Revolution was, therefore, welcomed both by Muslims and non-Muslims of the empire. Muslims, Christians, and Jews throughout the empire celebrated the revolution with spectacular demonstrations.<sup>65</sup>

After the revolution, it became clear that the idea of keeping all elements of the empire united would not work. The non-Muslim communities were looking into establishing their own nation-states rather than staying within the empire as subjects of the Sultan. In fact, the defeat of the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 necessitated a revision of the Unionist ideology that emphasized the multi-religiosity of the empire. Thereafter, the Young Turks changed their understanding of Ottoman identity by putting greater emphasis on Islam as the factor which could at least keep the Ottoman-Muslims together.<sup>66</sup>

The Young Turk movement followed a similar pattern in Cyprus. Emerging in the first half of the 1890s, the movement was represented by a group of Ottoman intellectuals on the island. With the arrival of the Unionist leader Hoca Muhiddin from Egypt, the movement gained momentum and protests took place demanding constitutional rights against the authoritarian rule of the Sultan.<sup>67</sup> Although the newspapers published by the Muslim community took any incident as an opportunity to express their loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, under the Young Turk influence they publicized the ideas of unionism, constitutional monarchy, progress and liberty on the island. The movement was so successful that the news of the 1908 Revolution was greeted with widespread jubilation not only by a small group of intellectuals but by the Muslim community as a whole.<sup>68</sup> On the day of the revolution, celebrations took place in *Kıraathane-i Osmani*, the gathering place of the Unionists in Cyprus. The rest of Cypriot society, especially the Muslim community, soon joined in the events to celebrate the new era. The pictures of the revolutionary

officers Enver and Niyazi could be seen everywhere in the island together with Ottoman flags. Popular expectation from the new regime was the creation of harmony between various religious, ethnic, and cultural elements of the empire through representation in the parliament. Similarly, the example of the new regime in Istanbul would be a rapprochement between Muslims and Christians in Cyprus. This idea is evident in the words of Jön Sırrı, the Young Turk author of the Muslim-Cypriot daily *Mirat-ı Zaman* on 14 September 1908:

From now on it will not only be our Mehmetts, but also our Dikrans, Yorgis and Josephs who sacrifice their lives at our borders. From now onwards there will be no clash between the crescent and the cross, no conflict between the Koran and the Bible because our Christians will defend the crescent.<sup>69</sup>

Niyazi [Berkes] and his twin brother Enver were born into the optimism engendered by the Revolution in 1908. The twins were first named by the African maid Pembe Hanım with two traditional names, Ahmet and Mehmet, which are widely used in the Muslim world even today.<sup>70</sup> However, these names were not welcomed by the father and the older brothers who regularly attended the *Kıraathane-i Osmani*, the Young Turk Club in Nicosia/Lefkoşa.<sup>71</sup> They wanted the twins to be named after the Unionist officers who led the uprising in Macedonia. Eventually, a compromise was found and the twins were named as Ahmet Niyazi and Mehmet Enver, which probably heightened the political and historical consciousness of the twins as they grew up in Cyprus.<sup>72</sup>

The expectations of peace and rapprochement between the communities soon ended when the Cretan Assembly decided to join Greece in 1908.<sup>73</sup> The ethnic strife between Muslims and Christians had been in progress for a long while in Crete. The Christian population in Crete rebelled against the empire several times together with the Greek nationalists. Although the rebels were suppressed in 1821 and 1869, the Ottomans had to recognize the island's autonomy after the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897.<sup>74</sup> In 1908, the Crete administration declared unification of the island with Greece which was recognized by the Ottomans in 1913.<sup>75</sup> Both for the Christians and the Muslims living in Crete, this had been a bloody process in which many Cretans were killed. Moreover, the Muslim community was forced to migrate to other parts of

the empire. In fact, out of 88,000 Cretan Muslims in 1895, hardly any of them remained in the island after the Greek takeover.<sup>76</sup>

The conflict in Crete was perceived by the Muslim community in Cyprus as having many parallels to what had been taking place in Cyprus. The *de facto* unification of Crete with Greece alerted the Muslims and the rhetoric of unionism, which aimed at keeping all religious elements of the empire together, came to an end. The defeats of the Ottoman army in Tripoli (1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912-13) also contributed to this ideological shift. The newspapers of the Christian community published articles humiliating the Muslim community and went so far that the British administration had to investigate them. In fact, the journalist Kyriakos Phylax was arrested by the British because of his articles inciting violence against the Muslim community.<sup>77</sup> Muslim papers, on the other hand, began to promote the idea of unionism again but this time only among the Muslims. One of the papers, *Vatan*, cited the Koranic verse “you shall not break up but stand united” (*va'tesimu ve la teferruku*) in its first issue published in 1911.<sup>78</sup> The new unionism no longer included the non-Muslim population of the island. The process of national identity formation in Cyprus had been accelerated.

On 12 January 1912, the Greek representatives in the legislative council demanded several amendments to the legislative and executive structure which would favor the Orthodox community. They also expressed their intention to end the British rule and to unite the island with Greece. Having heard that their demands were rejected by the British, the Greek representatives decided to protest by resigning from their posts in the council.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, the representatives also urged the Orthodox community to protest the British administration. The protest against British rule, however, turned into an anti-Muslim campaign in which Muslim homes and shops were assaulted.<sup>80</sup> This was mainly because of the composition of the police force which included a disproportionate number of Muslim officers. When the police officers fired on the crowd upon the order given by Captain Gallagher,<sup>81</sup> the British police chief, this was perceived by the protestors as a Muslim attack on Orthodox protestors. This incident led to a violent confrontation between the two communities and at the end of the day many civilians from both sides were killed or wounded. This was the first confrontation between the communities which resulted in mutual killings.<sup>82</sup> As a result, the relations between the two communities were irreparably broken. Any

possibility of peaceful coexistence and mutual tolerance were erased by ethnic conflict and mutual hatred.

The insecurity of the communities which resulted in the consolidation of Turkish and Greek national identities escalated every other day. The process peaked during the World War (1914-1918) when the Orthodox and the Muslims felt threatened by the possibility that their mother countries—Greece and Turkey—would be defeated. In fact, the Muslim community experienced trauma when the Ottomans were forced to sign the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 which left a truncated state for Muslims in Anatolia. Worried about their future in Cyprus, the Cyprus community closely followed the Turkish national struggle (1919-22) and within this process they developed an even greater Turkish national consciousness, possibly even before the Muslim masses in Anatolia.

### **World War One and the Turkish National Struggle, 1914-1922**

There was little resentment in the Muslim community when the British Empire took over the island's administration in 1878. The silence of the Muslims may be attributed to the fact that the Ottomans would, in theory, continue to be the legal suzerain of the island. Furthermore, any kind of conflict between the Ottomans and the British empires seemed to be unlikely at the time of the convention.<sup>83</sup> This projection, however, turned out to be incorrect when the Ottomans joined the Central Powers—Germany and Austria-Hungary—to fight Britain and the Triple Entente that included France and Russia. The war came to be a turning point in the history of the island, altering the political parameters in the island.

As an immediate outcome of the war, on 5 November 1914 Great Britain annexed the island claiming that the war annulled the Cyprus Convention of 1878.<sup>84</sup> This was perceived by the Orthodox community as the final stage in the progress towards *enosis*. In fact, Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece was reported by the Orthodox newspaper *Eleftheria* (14 November 1914) as saying that the British annexation of the island could be perceived as the final phase of the national restoration of this great Greek island to Greece.<sup>85</sup> The Muslim community, on the other hand, was quite cautious about the policy to be pursued in reaction to the annexation. Annoyed with the rumors of *enosis*, the representatives of the Muslim community decided to declare their loyalty to Britain by welcoming the annexation. The local Muslim elite submitted a letter to

the High Commissioner voicing their preference for staying within the British Empire rather than having a Greek takeover.<sup>86</sup>

Apart from the demands of the communities, the war strategy on its own determined the British policy over Cyprus. Although Cyprus had no strategic value for England since it had no harbor fit for naval purposes,<sup>87</sup> British policy-makers found a way to turn the island into a strategic asset by offering Cyprus to Greece in return for her intervention in the war. Under German influence, the Greek government declined the offer but “allowed free passage over its territory of the Allies’ troops going to the Serbian front and maintained an army on a war footing”.<sup>88</sup> The idea was to keep the window of opportunity open if Greece actively joined the Allies in the future.<sup>89</sup> The offer led to psychological devastation among the Muslim community. Drawing conclusions from the Cretan case, the Muslim community was alarmed that the Greek takeover would result in bloody conflicts and migration. This incident caused national awakening among the Muslims who began to associate themselves more and more with the people living in Anatolia. Alerted by the uneasiness of the Muslim community, the British administration declared that the offer had lapsed when the Greek government failed to agree to their terms. This, however, did not prevent the Orthodox delegates in the legislative council from submitting several proposals during the war for the concession of the island to Greece; this made the Muslim community feel threatened.

The idea of uniting the island with Greece was repeated when Greece joined the Entente powers in 1917. Greeks also took the opportunity to put forth the idea of unification when the Ottomans were defeated in 1918. Furthermore, the Paris Peace Conference was also used as a stage to lobby for *enosis*. In January 1919, a group of Orthodox representatives went to London to advocate the transfer of the island to Greece. Not surprisingly, the Sèvres Treaty (1920) also included articles handing over the island to Greece.

The constant emphasis on the issue of *enosis* triggered nationalism among the Muslim community. On several occasions Muslim Cypriots protested the demands for *enosis* and organized campaigns to provide financial aid for the national struggle in Anatolia. Eventually, the Muslim political elite called for a national congress in Cyprus and the Lefkoşa National Congress convened on 10 December 1918.<sup>90</sup> The congress was significant because it was the first time when Cypriot Muslims referred to the Turkish nation. Similar to the nationalist congresses which convened

in Sivas (1919) and Erzurum (1919), the Lefkoşa Congress illustrated that the Muslims in Cyprus had developed a Turkish national identity parallel to the Muslims in Anatolia. Turkish-Cypriot nationalists even attempted to launch a nationalist rebellion. According to the historian George Hill, the Turkish nationalist leaders, Dr. Esat, Dr. Behiç and Hasan Karabardak, attempted a rebellion by releasing Ottoman war prisoners who were kept in Famagusta.<sup>91</sup> However, they were arrested before any rebellion could be organized.

Despite the failure of the nationalists to organize a rebellion, Turkish nationalism prevailed among the Muslim community in Cyprus. Muslims strongly identified with the Kemalist nationalists who were fighting against Britain and Greece together with other imperial powers. The Turkish dailies *Söz* and *Doğru Yol* communicated nationalist ideas thus strengthening Turkish nationalism among the Cypriot Muslims. The following excerpt from Mehmet Remzi, a columnist in the daily *Söz*, illustrates the nationalist state of mind promoted by the dailies:

Not only to the Orthodox Cypriots but also to all Greeks and to the world, we declare that Turkey was not and will not come to the ground. So long as the sun shines over the earth, Turkishness will exist with perfect stability.<sup>92</sup>

The Muslim community had cultivated a new Turkish identity based on nationality as a result of the process which went back to the early years of the British rule. Niyazi [Berkes] grew up during these years when the Turkish national identity was being crystallized. The traces of this process can be seen on his identity. Niyazi [Berkes] was six years old when the world war started; he was fourteen when the Turkish national struggle ended. In this period, he was exposed to the nationalist curriculum drafted by the teachers who first adhered to the Ottomanist Young Turk ideology but then became Turkish nationalists. Since the British administration did not allow newspapers to be published in Turkish during the world war, he was exposed to the ideas expressed in such papers as *Vakit*, *İkdam*, *Vatan*, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, and *Akşam* smuggled from Anatolia. In his memoirs, he recalls that he was following the columns by Süleyman Nazif, Abdülhak Hamit, Halide Edip, Falih Rıfki, and Yakup Kadri who supported the Turkish national struggle.<sup>93</sup> This implies that he felt empathy for the nationalist struggle in Anatolia thanks to the news and comments

conveyed by the Turkish newspapers. Niyazi [Berkes] claims that the most spectacular years in his life were the years of the national struggle in Anatolia:

During the war years, the Turkish Cypriots could not migrate anywhere. They were worried about possible massacre of the Turks by the Greeks who were spoiled by British friendship... I was eleven when the war started and fourteen when it ended. My consciousness was aroused by the developments between these ages. I have always been under the influence of the events that took place in this period much more than any peers of mine in Turkey. The mental and emotional aspects of my personality were shaped by the events of this period.<sup>94</sup>

Within this context, Niyazi [Berkes] developed a sense of national identity like other members of the Muslim community in Cyprus. He valued the concept of fatherland within a community which was traumatized by the fear of losing the territory to which they felt attached. His memories of his mother, Dervişe Hanım, praying for the victory of the nationalists in Anatolia were still alive years later when he wrote his memoirs towards the end of his life.<sup>95</sup> His patriotism seems to have its origins in his childhood and adolescence in British Cyprus when new identities were being formed.

But the fears of the Muslim community did not become a reality. The Kemalist nationalists won victory in the Turkish Independence War on 9 September 1922. However, Cyprus was beyond the reach of the Kemalists. This resulted in a migration from Cyprus to the new Turkey. Among the migrants were Niyazi [Berkes] and his family. They decided to move to the capital of the late Ottoman Empire now that it had been saved by the nationalists. In Istanbul, the family felt safer and the twins, Enver and Niyazi would have access to the best educational institutions the city of the Sultans, *pay-i taht* could provide. On 24 July 1923 Kemalist nationalists signed the Treaty of Lausanne and the borders of the new Turkey were recognized by the international community. With this treaty, the Kemalists also succeeded in preventing the concession of Cyprus to Greece but they had to recognize British annexation of the island. In the new Turkey being made by the nationalists, Niyazi [Berkes]

began a new phase in his life which lasted until the day in 1952 when he would be obliged to go into voluntary exile to North America.

## Endnotes

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- <sup>1</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964).
- <sup>2</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Bazı Ankara Köyleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma [A Survey on Several Villages of Ankara]* (Ankara: Ankara University DTCF Press, 1942).
- <sup>3</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi [Turkey's Economic History]* (Istanbul: Gerçek Press, vol. 1, 1969; vol. 2, 1970).
- <sup>4</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar [Forgotten Years]*, compiled by Ruşen Sezer (Istanbul: İletişim Press, 1997), 33.
- <sup>5</sup> Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs [Cyprus in the Dilemma of Nationalism]*, (Istanbul: İletişim Press, 2005).
- <sup>6</sup> Kemal Çiçek, "Lefkoşe: İki Dilli, İki Dinli, İki Toplumlu Bir Osmanlı Şehrinin Portresi, [*Nicosia: The Portrait of a Bi-lingual, Bi-religious, Bi-communal Ottoman City*]," in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Cyprus Studies*, eds. İsmail Bozkurt, Hüseyin Ateşin and M. Kansu (Famagusta: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 1998), 95.
- <sup>7</sup> In this paragraph, the list of the countries that invaded Cyprus has been taken from *The Encyclopedia Britannica: A New Survey of Universal Knowledge*, vol. 6, 14th edn (London: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1937), 933-34.
- <sup>8</sup> Norman Itkowitz and Vamık Volkan, "Turkish and Greek Identities and a Comparison between Them," in *Proceedings of the First International Congress on Cypriot Studies*, eds. Emel Doğramacı, William Haney, and Güray König (Famagusta: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 1996), 181.
- <sup>9</sup> Norman Itkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), 59; see also H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).
- <sup>10</sup> The Ottoman understanding of the state can be attributed to the concept of the "circle of equity" which illustrates the circular relationships among the various classes of society and their functions in a well-run state. The circle of equity is defined by Norman Itkowitz as follows: "1. There can be no royal authority without the military. 2. There can be no military without wealth. 3. The *reaya* produce the wealth. 4. The Sultan keeps the *reaya* by making justice reign. 5. Justice requires harmony in the world. 6. The world is a garden; its walls are the state. 7. The state's prop is the religious law. 8. There

is no support for the religious law without royal authority.” See Itkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*, 88.

- <sup>11</sup> Feroz Ahmad, “Young Turk-Armenian Relations During the Second Constitutional Period 1908-1914,” in *Armenians in the Ottoman Society*, ed. Metin Hülagü (Kayseri: Erciyes University Printing House, 2008), 305.
- <sup>12</sup> For an historical account of the Ottoman millet system, see: Daniel Goffman, “Ottoman *Millets* in the Early Seventeenth Century,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 11 (Fall 1994): 135-58; Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myth of the Millet System” and Karpat, Kemal H. “*Millets* and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era,” in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of A Plural Society*, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982), 69-88 and 141-69.
- <sup>13</sup> İbrahim Hakkı Bey, “Muhtasar Kıbrıs Coğrafyası [*The Concise Geography of Cyprus*], 1906,” transliterated into Latin alphabet by Harid Fedai, *Kıbrıs Türk Kültürü Makaleler [Cypriot Turkish Culture Articles]*, vol.1 (Nicosia: SAMTAY Foundation, 2005), 49.
- <sup>14</sup> *Cyprus (Magazine)* “Supplement to ‘Great Britain and the East’ Incorporating the ‘Near East and India’” (London, Athens, Alexandria, 4 February 1937), 24.
- <sup>15</sup> Niyazi Berkes, “Kişisel Anılar [*Personal Memories*],” in *Atatürk ve Devrimler [Ataturk and the Revolution]* (Istanbul: Adam Press, 1982), 12.
- <sup>16</sup> See H.T. Norris, *Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World* (London: Hurst & Company, 1993); and Ivo Andrić, *The Bridge on the Drina* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).
- <sup>17</sup> Yusuf Küçükdağ, “Kıbrıs Tekke ve Zaviyeleri [*Dervish Lodges in Cyprus*],” in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Cyprus Studies*, 381-83.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 30.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Charles Fraser Beckingham, “Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus,” *Die Welt des Islams* 5 (1/2) (1957): 67.
- <sup>22</sup> Oğuz Yorgancıoğlu, “Niyazi Berkes Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme, 1908-188 [*An Evaluation on Niyazi Berkes*],” *First Symposium on Remarkable Turkish Cypriots*, ed. İsmail Bozkurt (21-23 April 1999), 85.
- <sup>23</sup> Nergis Canefe, “Türklük Tarihi ve Kıbrıs: Kıbrıslı Türk Kimliğinin Hikayelenmesinde Bir Yolağzı [*History of Turkishness and Cyprus: An Introduction to the Narrative of Turkish Cypriot Identity*],” in *Milliyetçilik*,

- Bellek ve Aidiyet [Nationalism, Memory and Belonging]* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2007), 366.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 365-70.
- <sup>25</sup> See for example Doros Alastos, *Cyprus in History: A Survey in 5000 Year*, (London: Zeno Publishers, 1976), 308; and Ahmet Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler: Bugünlere Gelmek Kolay Olmadı [The Turks Encircled by Enosis]* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research and Publication Center, 1996), 35-40.
- <sup>26</sup> Rolandos Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*, (Lefkoşa: Cyprus Research Centre, 1996); Rebecca Bryant, *Tebaadan Vatandaşa Kıbrıs'ta Modernite ve Milliyetçilik [From Subjects to Citizens: Modernity and Nationalism in Cyprus]* (Istanbul: İletişim Press, 2002).
- <sup>27</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991).
- <sup>28</sup> Eric Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
- <sup>29</sup> The Annex of the Cyprus Convention of 1878 included the following clauses: "1. A Muslim religious tribunal should continue to function, taking exclusive cognizance of religious matters concerning the Muslims. 2. A Muslim resident of the island, nominated by the Board of Pious Foundations in Turkey, should superintend the administration of all property belonging to Muslim Pious Foundations and the religious establishment, with a delegate appointed by the British authorities. 3. Great Britain would pay the Porte annually the current excess of revenue over expenditure, which was calculated by the average of the last five years and stated to be 22,936 purses (11,468-000 *piastres* or approximately 95,567 pounds), to be verified later, the produce of State and Crown lands let or sold during that period being excluded. 4. The Porte was to have the right to sell and lease lands and other property belonging to the Ottoman Crown and State, the produce of which would not form part of the revenue referred to in article three. The British Government was to have the right to purchase compulsorily, at a fair price, land required for public purposes. 6. If Russia restored to Turkey Kars and other conquests made by it in Armenia during the last war, Cyprus would be evacuated by England and the Convention of June 4, 1878, annulled." See in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East –A Documentary Record: 1914-1956*, vol. 2 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956), 31-3.

- <sup>30</sup> “Cyprus, the Suez Canal, and Disraeli,” *New York Times* (31 May 1896) *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, <<http://www.proquest.com>>
- <sup>31</sup> H. L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India*, (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), 443.
- <sup>32</sup> The Ottoman Empire was considered to be a European state since after the Treaty of Paris in 1856.
- <sup>33</sup> Halil İbrahim Salih, *Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord* (New York: Theo Gaus’ Sons Inc., 1968), 24.
- <sup>34</sup> For the origins of this epithet, see: Christopher de Bellaigue, “The Sick Man of Europe,” *New York Review of Books*, (5 July 2001).
- <sup>35</sup> Robert Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean* (New York: Praeger, 1966).
- <sup>36</sup> Bryant, *Tebaadan Vatandaşa Kıbrıs’ta Modernite ve Milliyetçilik*, 36.
- <sup>37</sup> Jan-Erik Smilden “When the Turks saved the Greek Cypriots,” in *Are We Captives of History: Historical Essays on Turkey and Europe*, ed. A. Johansson *et al.* (Oslo: Oslo Academic Press, 2007), 75-6.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.
- <sup>39</sup> Bryant, *Tebaadan Vatandaşa Kıbrıs’ta Modernite ve Milliyetçilik*, 38–39.
- <sup>40</sup> Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, 35–36.
- <sup>41</sup> Bryant, *Tebaadan Vatandaşa Kıbrıs’ta Modernite ve Milliyetçilik*, 40.
- <sup>42</sup> Adamantia Pollis, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus,” *Comparative Politics* 5 (4) (1973), 575-99.
- <sup>43</sup> Salih, *Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord*, 26-7.
- <sup>44</sup> Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, 44.
- <sup>45</sup> Pollis, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy,” 591-2.
- <sup>46</sup> Canefe, “Türklük Tarihi ve Kıbrıs,” 367.
- <sup>47</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
- <sup>48</sup> Andreas Cl. Sophocleus, “The First Cypriot Newspapers and the British Administration,” *GMJ: Mediterranean Edition* 1 (1) (2006): 117-19.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.
- <sup>50</sup> Süleyman İrvan, “Kıbrıslı Türk Gazetecilerin Mesleki ve Etik Değerleri, [*Professional and Ethical Values of Cypriot Turkish Journalists*]” *Küresel İletişim Dergisi [Journal of Cultural Communication]* 1 (2006): 3.
- <sup>51</sup> In India, for instance, the British administration required the assistance of the Indians who were competent in the English language and culture for the effective functioning of the state. With this purpose, schools and colleges were opened to “cultivate a local elite who could understand them, and their concepts of rule, who were willing to be inducted into politics, into a public

arena where they could freely give allegiance and loyalty to the British crown, a class of persons as Macaulay had put it [...], ‘Indian in color and blood but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.’” Sunil Khilnani “Who is an Indian,” in *The Idea of India* (New York: Farrar, 2002), 22-3.

- <sup>52</sup> For an analysis of the peculiarities of British colonial education in Cyprus see Panayiotis Persianis, “The British Colonial Education ‘Lending’ Policy in Cyprus (1878-1960): An Intriguing Example of an Elusive ‘Adapted Education’ Policy,” *Comparative Education* 32 (1) (1996): 45-68.
- <sup>53</sup> Rolandos Katsiaounis, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus*, 84.
- <sup>54</sup> Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, 78.
- <sup>55</sup> H.D. Purcell, *Cyprus*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 238.
- <sup>56</sup> Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, 63-64.
- <sup>57</sup> Purcell, *Cyprus*, 238.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>59</sup> “In Foreign Lands: Cyprus Wishes to Withdraw from British Rule,” *New York Times* (29 March 1903); *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, <<http://www.proquest.com>>
- <sup>60</sup> Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, 81-2.
- <sup>61</sup> For an historical account of the Young Turks see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks. The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
- <sup>62</sup> Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- <sup>63</sup> For a study on Young Turk ideology see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri [Political Ideas of Young Turks], 1898-1908* (Ankara: İş Bank Press, 1964).
- <sup>64</sup> Sina Akşin, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi [A Concise History of Turkey]*, (İstanbul: İş Bank Press, 2007), 49.
- <sup>65</sup> Sacit Kutlu compiled a book of postcards that illustrates the celebrations of the 1908 Revolution in Istanbul. Sacit Kutlu, *Didâr-ı Hürriyet: Kartpostallarla İkinci Meşrutiyet [Beautiful Face of Liberty: Second Constitutional Regime on Postcards]* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004).
- <sup>66</sup> Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (London: University of California Press, 1997), 141-3.

- <sup>67</sup> Bülent Evre, “Jön Türk Hareketinin Kıbrıs’a Etkisi, [*The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on Cyprus*]” *Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi [Journal of Academic Research]* 35 (2005): 10.
- <sup>68</sup> Altay Nevzat, *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Oulu, 2005), 169.
- <sup>69</sup> Quoted in Hüseyin Mehmet Ateşin, “Kıbrıs Adasında “Müslüman Halkın Laikleşme ve Türk Kimliğine Geçiş Sürecinde Kıbrıs Türk Basını’nın ve Aydınları’nın Oynadıkları Rol, [*The Role of Cypriot Turkish Press and Intellectuals in Secularization and Turkish Identity Formation of the Muslim People in Cyprus Island*]” *Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Cyprus Studies*, 195-96. Translation is mine.
- <sup>70</sup> Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 33.
- <sup>71</sup> Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 34.
- <sup>72</sup> Feroz Ahmad (1998) “Introductory Essay, Niyazi Berkes: The Education of an Intellectual,” in *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Niyazi Berkes (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), xv.
- <sup>73</sup> “Crete Decides to Join Greece,” *New York Times* (8 October 1908); *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, <<http://www.proquest.com>>
- <sup>74</sup> Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, 85–7.
- <sup>75</sup> “Turks Give Up All Except Adrinople,” *New York Times* (2 January 1913); *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, 4, <<http://www.proquest.com>>
- <sup>76</sup> Purcell, *Cyprus*, 240.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 239.
- <sup>78</sup> Quoted in Harid Fedai, “Kıbrıs Türk Basınında Vatan, [Fatherland in Cypriot Turkish Press]” *Kıbrıs Türk Kültürü Makaleler [Cypriot Turkish Culture Articles]*, 5.
- <sup>79</sup> Salih, *Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord*, 29.
- <sup>80</sup> Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, 111–12.
- <sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.
- <sup>82</sup> Sabahattin İsmail, “Kıbrıs Türk Halkı’nın Ulusal Mücadelesi’nde İlkler [The First Cases in the National Struggle of the Cypriot Turkish People],” in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Cyprus Studies*, 146.
- <sup>83</sup> Beckingham, “Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus,” 68.
- <sup>84</sup> “Cyprus,” *New York Times* (6 November 1914); *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, <<http://www.proquest.com>>
- <sup>85</sup> Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, 134.
- <sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

- <sup>87</sup> “Cyprus,” *New York Times* (6 November 1914); *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, <<http://www.proquest.com>>
- <sup>88</sup> “Greek Government Defends its Stand,” *New York Times* (24 October 1915) *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, <<http://www.proquest.com>>
- <sup>89</sup> “Cyprus A Gift to Greece,” *New York Times* (25 October 1915) *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, <<http://www.proquest.com>>
- <sup>90</sup> İsmail, “Kıbrıs Türk Halkı’nın Ulusal Mücadelesi’nde İlkler,” 147.
- <sup>91</sup> George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).
- <sup>92</sup> Quoted in Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, 171. Translation is mine.
- <sup>93</sup> Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 36.
- <sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.
- <sup>95</sup> Berkes, “Kişisel Anılar,” 12.